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Gender and Culture: International Experimental
Evidence from Trust Games
By RACHEL CROSON AND NANCY BUCHAN*
Gender is rarely included as a factor in eco-
nomics models. However, recent work in
experimental economics, as well as in psy-
chology and political science, suggests that
gender is an important determinant of eco-
nomic and strategic behavior.
We examine gender differences in bargain-
ing using the ‘‘trust game’’ introduced by
Joyce Berg et al. (1995).1 In this two-person
game, the ‘‘proposer’’ is given a choice of
sending some, all, or none of his or her $10
experimental payment to an anonymous part-
ner, the ‘‘responder.’’ The experimenter tri-
ples any money sent. The responder then
chooses how much of his or her total wealth
(his or her $10 experimental payment plus the
tripled money) to return to the proposer. Any
money the responder does not return may be
kept ( thus the responder is playing a dictator
game with his or her endowment plus three
times the amount the proposer sent ) . The
unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is
for the proposer to send no money and for the
responder to return none.
For U.S. subjects, Berg et al. found that 30
of 32 proposers deviated from this economic
equilibrium and sent some money to their part-
ners ( the average amount sent was $5.16). In
* Operations and Information Management Depart-
ment, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6366, and School of Business,
University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706-0394, re-
spectively. Data in this paper were originally collected for
a cross-cultural experimental study, reported in Buchan et
al. (1998). The authors thank Eric Johnson for his help
and support, as well as Bingfu Chen, Wujin Chu, and
Hotatka Katahira, and their research assistants, for their
help in collecting the data for this research.
1 This game is similar to the trust game in David Kreps
(1990) and the peasant–dictator game in John Van Huyck
et al. (1995). All have the same prediction that play
should end immediately, even though strict Pareto im-
provements to payoffs can be found in later stages. For a
detailed comparison of the games see Berg et al. (1995).
sending money, proposers are trusting that
their partners will return some money to them.
In addition, 24 out of 32 of responders who
received money returned some (the average
amount returned was $4.66 ) . In returning
money, responders are reciprocating the pro-
poser’s actions.
In this paper we look for gender differences
in this game. We use data previously collected
from four countries ( the United States, China,
Japan, and Korea) and report gender differ-
ences in proposer ( trusting) behavior and re-
sponder (reciprocating) behavior. We find no
significant effect of gender on amount sent by
proposers ( trust behavior) . However, we find
that women return (reciprocate) significantly
more of their wealth than men, both in the
United States and internationally.
I. The Impact of Gender in
Previous Experiments
Catherine Eckel and Philip Grossman
(1999) review a budding literature on gender
in experimental economics. For purposes of
this paper, we focus on their discussion of dif-
ferences in bargaining.
In ultimatum games in the laboratory, gen-
der has been observed to influence a variety of
decisions.2 Eckel and Grossman (1998b) dem-
onstrate chivalry (men accept lower offers
from women than from men) and solidarity
(women accept lower offers from women than
from men). Sara Solnick (1998) finds, in con-
trast, that players of both sexes demand more
2 In the ultimatum game, one player (the proposer)
makes an offer to another ( the responder) of how to divide
a fixed amount of money. The responder can accept or
reject the proposer’s offer. If the offer is accepted, the
money is divided as proposed; if the offer is rejected, both
players earn zero. The unique subgame-perfect equilib-
rium of this game is for the proposer to offer the responder
« and for the responder to accept.
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from women than from men. Both studies
found that offers were lower to women than
to men, and that offers from women and men
were not significantly different.
Other researchers have investigated gender ef-
fects in the dictator game.3 Eckel and Grossman
(1998a) found that women give more than men
in these games, while Gary Bolton and Elena
Katok (1995) found no significant difference.
James Andreoni and Lise Vesterlund (1998)
compared gender behavior in dictator games as
the monetary value of the tokens being divided
was varied among players. They found that
women gave more overall and were more likely
to divide tokens evenly despite different mone-
tary values, while men became less generous as
the value of their tokens increased relative to the
value of the responder’s tokens. Finally, Eckel
and Grossman (1996) examined gender differ-
ences in a punishment game, where subjects
could choose to divide evenly a $10 (or $12)
pie with someone who had previously been un-
generous with another subject, or an $8 pie with
someone who had previously been generous.
They found that women were at least as likely
as men to punish ungenerous counterparts by
choosing to divide the $8 pie.
As Eckel and Grossman (1999) have ob-
served, the findings regarding gender seem to
be conditional on the level of risk present in
the experiment. In decisions where risk is in-
volved, such as for the proposer in ultimatum
games, there appear to be no systematic dif-
ferences in behavior across genders. However,
for decisions involving no risk, such as for dic-
tators or ‘‘punishers,’’ women tend to be more
generous and socially oriented in their behav-
ior. In this paper, we examine behavior in an
experiment involving both risky and riskless
decisions. Proposers take a risk by sending
money to the responder. Responders face no
risk when deciding how much money, if any,
to return. Our results are consistent with Eckel
and Grossman’s distinction. We find a signif-
3 In the dictator game, one player, the allocator, is given
a fixed amount of money to divide between himself and
another player, the recipient. The allocator chooses a di-
vision, and the money is divided as proposed. This is not
a game in the formal sense, but rather an individual de-
cision problem.
icant gender difference in the riskless reci-
procity decisions and no difference in the risky
trusting decisions.
II. Experimental Design and Procedure
The experimental design used in this study
involves an examination of culture, commu-
nication, and the social distance between play-
ers. For purposes of this study, these factors
are treated as nuisance variables, and are con-
trolled for in the analysis. A complete dis-
cussion of the experimental design and
procedures can be found in Buchan et al.
(1998); here we present a shortened version.
Experimental instructions are available from
the authors upon request.
Subjects are randomly assigned to the roles
of proposer or responder and are directed to
separate rooms. There they receive instruc-
tions for the trust game and are paid their en-
dowment in local currency. Proposers are
instructed to place any money they wish to
send to their partner in an envelope. Monitors
collect the envelopes and take them to the ex-
perimenter, in a different room, who records
the amount of money sent. She then triples the
amounts sent by proposers, places the tripled
money into envelopes, and sends these enve-
lopes into the respondents’ room via another
monitor. The respondents receive their enve-
lopes, and decide how much of their own ex-
perimental fee plus any tripled money received
to return to their partners. Monitors collect the
envelopes from the responders and give them
to the experimenter. The experimenter records
any amounts returned, places the money back
into the proposers’ original envelopes, and
sends them back to the proposers’ room for
distribution. The experiment is then con-
cluded; subjects turn in a post-experimental
questionnaire and leave with their earnings.
This procedure, though elaborate, ensures a
double-blind experiment. Throughout the ex-
periment, subjects remain unaware of their
partners’ identities (and thus their genders) ,
and the experimenter who is recording
amounts sent and returned is also unaware of
the subjects’ identities. The anonymity af-
forded by this procedure helps to reduce in-
clinations on part of subjects to ‘‘please the
experimenter’’ ( i.e., to behave in what they
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TABLE 1—GENDER BY ROLE AND COUNTRY
Role and
gender
Number of subjects
China Japan Korea United States Total
Proposers
Male 18 20 25 7 70
Female 6 2 0 15 23
Responders
Male 16 18 23 9 66
Female 8 4 2 13 27
believe is the manner expected by the experi-
menter) . Thus a double-blind experiment pro-
vides an environment in which self-interested
behavior is as uninhibited as possible within a
controlled setting (Elizabeth Hoffman et al.,
1994). It also likely reduces ‘‘face-saving’’
behavior on the part of subjects—behaviors
that might be especially prevalent in East
Asian countries (Michael Bond and Kwang-
Kuo Hwang, 1996). Any deviations from the
self-interested equilibrium that appear in this
environment are strong indicators of real ten-
dencies on the part of the subjects to be trusting
and cooperative, rather than impression-
management techniques.
A total of 186 subjects participated in this
experiment: 48 students from Nankai Univer-
sity in China, 50 students from Seoul National
University in Korea, 44 students from Tokyo
University in Japan, and 44 students from the
University of Pennsylvania in the United
States. Subjects were randomly recruited
sophomore or junior economics or business
students, who completed the experiment for
course credit and for actual monetary earnings.4
III. Experimental Results
A. Description of the Data
For purposes of analysis, monetary amounts
across the four countries have been standard-
ized on a scale from 0 to 1,000 units. Our de-
pendent variables are the amounts sent by
proposers and the proportions returned by re-
sponders. We calculate the proportion returned
as the amount responders returned divided by
their total wealth (three times the amount the
proposer sent plus the endowment) . Across all
countries and cultures, the mean amount sent
by proposers was 671.91 units (out of 1,000
units) , and only three of the 92 proposers sent
nothing to their partners.5 Ten responders re-
4 To ensure equivalence in experimental conditions and
procedures across the four countries studied, we employed
a number of cross-cultural experimental controls sug-
gested by Alvin Roth et al. (1991). These are discussed
in depth in Buchan et al. (1998).
5 The mean amount sent in the Berg et al. (1995) trust
game was $5.16 (out of $10.00). The mean amount sent
turned zero ( three of whom had received
zero) . The average proportion returned was
31.2 percent. Seventy-eight responders out of
92 (85 percent) returned at least as much as
had been sent, while the remaining 15 percent
returned less than had been sent.
Of the four countries, women had the high-
est representation among the U.S. subjects.
The numbers of women and men in each role
of the experiment are detailed in Table 1.
B. Analysis of Gender
There are two main results of this experi-
ment. First, there is no significant gender-
related difference in the amounts sent by
proposers. Second, women responders return
significantly more than male responders, even
controlling for the amount received. These re-
sults are described in Table 2.
We first analyze the amounts sent (out of
1,000 units) by women and men in all four
countries. The average amount sent by women
is 630.4, and the average amount sent by men
is 696.4. A Wilcoxon test finds no significant
difference between these two samples, nor
does a t test. Regressions of amount sent on
gender, either alone or in combination with
controls for the different treatments in the ex-
periment and either with and without indicator
variables for the countries, indicate no signif-
icant effect of gender. One collected measure
from the post-experimental questionnaire that
does have a significant and positive effect on
by the American subjects in our experiment was slightly
higher, at $6.47 (out of $10.00). The difference is likely
due to the added communication treatment in our
experiment.
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TABLE 2—AVERAGE AMOUNTS SENT
AND RETURNED, BY GENDER
Gender
Amount
senta
Amount
returned
Proportion
returnedb
Men 696.4 928.0 28.6
(286.1) (688.7) (17.8)
Women 630.4 1,215.1 37.4
(260.6) (603.1) (13.8)
Total 680.1 1,013.5 31.2
(280.1) (674.2) (17.1)
Notes: Amounts sent are out of 1,000 units; the propor-
tions returned are reported as percentages. Numbers in pa-
rentheses are standard deviations.
a The gender-related difference in amounts sent is not
statistically significant.
b The gender-related difference in the proportion re-
turned is statistically significant (p  0.0183).
TABLE 3—REGRESSIONS OF PROPORTION RETURNED
ON GENDER AND OTHER CONTROL VARIABLES
Independent
variable
Regression
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Intercept 0.3299** 0.3307** 0.3352** 0.1294** 0.1004†
Gendera 0.0443* 0.0469* 0.0603** 0.0523** 0.0726**
Social distance 0.0124 0.0147 0.0147 00.0098
Discussion 00.0106 00.0117 00.0281† 00.0172
China 0.0272 0.0136 0.0367†
Japan 0.0311 0.0260
Korea 0.0072 0.0132
Amount sent 0.0003** 0.0003**
Adjusted R2: 0.0464 0.0345 0.0484 0.2852 0.4481
Number of
observations: 93 93 93 93 46
Notes: Regressions (i)–(iv) were run on the entire sample of re-
sponders in all four countries; regression (v) uses only the data from
China and the United States.
a Female  1.
† Statistically significant at the 10-percent level.
* Statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 1-percent level.
the amount proposers send is the amount they
expect to have returned to them (proposers
completed these questionnaires after they sent
their money but before receiving anything
from the respondents) . However, there are no
differences between men’s and women’s ex-
pectations in this setting.6
We next turn to our analysis of the propor-
tion returned by responders. The average pro-
portion returned by women is 37.4 percent,
and the corresponding proportion for men 28.6
percent. A Wilcoxon test finds that women re-
turn a significantly higher percentage than men
(p  0.0183) as does a t test.
Table 3 presents results for a number of re-
gressions of proportion returned on gender and
other control variables. In all these regres-
sions, gender has a significant impact on the
proportion that responders return; specifically,
women return a significantly higher proportion
than men. Regressions (i) – (iv) control for
the treatment responders were in, the country
they were from, and the amount that was sent
to them. Notice that women return a signifi-
cantly higher proportion, even in this last re-
gression, which controls for the amount they
received.
6 One concern is that there are extremely few women
in the samples from Japan and Korea; however, similar
analyses using only data from the United States and China
yield the same results.
Interestingly there is a significant effect of
the amount sent (out of 1,000) on the propor-
tion returned. As proposers send more to re-
sponders, responders reciprocate by returning
not just more absolutely, but by returning a
higher proportion. This suggests that respond-
ers are not simply using a rule that says, for
example, ‘‘reimburse the proposer by return-
ing the amount sent,’’ but instead are reward-
ing proposers for their trust. The final
regression, (v) , uses only the data from China
and the United States (since there were rela-
tively few women in the experiments run in
Japan and Korea) with similar results.7
What might be causing female responders
to return more than male responders? Two ex-
planations come to mind. First, it might be that
women are simply more altruistic than men.
Second, it might be that women are more
likely to reciprocate than men. The next sec-
tion discusses these two explanations and sug-
gests evidence for each.
IV. Summary and Discussion
Two main results emerge from this experi-
ment. The amount of trust exhibited in this
game (the amount sent) is not significantly
7 Regressions run for each country individually also
yielded similar results.
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different between men and women. However,
women exhibit significantly more reciprocity
in this game (by returning a higher proportion
of their wealth) .
There are two possible explanations for this
latter result. First, it may simply be that
women are more altruistic than men ( i.e.,
women care more about their partner’s con-
sumption than men do), and thus they return
a higher proportion of their earnings. Some ex-
perimental evidence suggests that this might
be the case ( e.g., Eckel and Grossman,
1998a). However, if this were so we would
expect to see a significant gender effect in both
amounts sent and proportion returned—not
only in the latter. Alternatively, as Andreoni
and Vesterlund (1998) suggest, it may be that
women are more altruistic when the costs and
benefits of giving are symmetric, but men may
be more altruistic when the benefit of giving
is higher than the costs. Specifically, Andreoni
and Vesterlund find that, while women give
significantly more when costs and benefits are
symmetric ( t  2.26 and t  1.42 for their
budget 4 and 8), when the value of giving is
three times the cost of giving (as in our pro-
poser’s situation), men give significantly more
than women ( t  1.96 for their budget 1) .
However, the data in our experiment do not
demonstrate this pattern. While women are
more altruistic than men in the second stage,
in the first stage (where the money sent is tri-
pled) , men’s contributions are the same as
those of women’s.
However, our experiment is different in an
important respect from this previous work in
that subjects were not simply playing a series
of dictator games. Instead, they were linked in
an important way: the amount the responder
returned went back to the proposer who had
created the pie to be divided in the first place.
Our results suggest that a different motive, rec-
iprocity, could be driving the differences be-
tween male and female behavior in this
setting.8 This explanation involves women be-
ing more likely to reciprocate than males,
8 Recent models of reciprocity include Bolton (1991),
Matthew Rabin ( 1993 ) , Bolton and Axel Ockenfels
(1998), and Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt (1998). None
includes gender as a variable in the analysis.
rather than being simply more altruistic. This
is consistent with results from Eckel and
Grossman (1996), who showed that women
were as likely as men, or more likely, to re-
ciprocally punish (reward) unfair (fair) be-
havior in others.9
Some evidence in favor of reciprocity is
provided by the post-experimental question-
naires. While waiting to receive money from
the proposers, responders were asked how ob-
ligated they felt to return at least as much to
the proposer as the proposer sent to them.
Women felt significantly more obligated than
men to do so (X 2  12.65, p  0.049), with
57 percent of women saying they felt ‘‘ex-
tremely obligated,’’ compared with only 24
percent of men. This supports the explanation
of women being more likely to reciprocate
than men, independent of their altruistic
leanings.
Finally, our findings are consistent with
the relationship suggested by Eckel and
Grossman (1999) between risk and gender.
In our experiment, proposers, who were fac-
ing substantial risk in sending money to the
responders, did not exhibit gender-related
differences in their behavior. In contrast,
when making a riskless decision, female re-
sponders returned significantly more than
their male counterparts.
While economic models have previously
been gender-blind, evidence presented in this
and other research suggests that the models
should be expanded to incorporate systematic
effects of characteristics such as gender in set-
tings like bargaining, where issues of trust and
reciprocity are likely to have an impact.
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